Abstract We consider the exploitation of a transboundary (shared stock) …shery which is managed by means of national quotas determined as agreed shares of a total allowable catch (TAC). Given its annual quota allocation, each country maximises current period bene…ts while choosing a level of costly enforcement e¤ort with which to secure what it considers to be an acceptable degree of quota compliance by its …shing ‡eet. We compare this level of enforcement with the socially optimal level, given the agreed quotas. We also explore the optimal solution to the setting of quotas in addition to enforcement levels.
Introduction
The problem of the cooperative (or indeed non-cooperative) management of shared renewable resources, such as transboundary …sh stocks, has received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, primarily from a game theoretic perspective (see, for example, Kaitala 1986 , Kaitala and Lindroos 2007 , Lindroos 2008 , Munro 2009 and Hannesson 2011 . In general, analysis has focused on the determination of optimal harvest shares and the possibilities for cooperative agreement on harvests by participating countries.
In common with most theoretical models of …shery exploitation, either harvest itself or harvest as a function of …shing "e¤ort"is taken as the control variable. In practice, however, national administrations are only able to control harvest indirectly, by introducing management measures (such as quotas) and then expending enforcement e¤ort in order to achieve a degree of compliance by their …shing industries. Given that enforcement is costly, and hence there is a social cost to controlling harvest, the need for enforcement implies second best solutions in which optimal harvests di¤er from those which would hold were enforcement perfect and costless. 1 It is also apparent that, in the case of many shared …sh stocks (for example, those within the EEZs of the European Union), international agreements do exist on harvest shares, at least in principle. Once such agreements are reached, moreover, they tend to endure, since they are politically costly to renegotiate.
2 The fundamental problems for resource management in such cases are, …rstly, the setting of an appropriate total harvest or "total allowable catch"(TAC) -usually on an annual basis -to be divided amongst participating countries as national quotas, and secondly, compliance with those quotas by national …shing ‡eets, which depends upon countries'individual enforcement e¤orts. These realworld problems are the focus of this paper. To illustrate the problems, we have in mind a …shery such as the Northeast Atlantic cod …shery, which is shared between Norway and Russia and which has raised signi…cant enforcement issues over the years (see Sumaila 1997 and Hannesson 2007 ).
In the paper we model the exploitation of a shared (transboundary) …sh stock by two countries which have previously reached agreement on their percentage shares of an annual TAC. Once the TAC is determined, therefore, each country's quota is …xed and the problem for the country is then to choose a level of costly enforcement e¤ort to apply to its ‡eet in order to maximise national economic bene…ts while securing an acceptable degree of compliance with the quota. Given the national quota and the level of enforcement, the ‡eets then respond rationally with a privately optimal harvest level. We assume, however, that the country knows this harvest response function when it chooses a level of enforcement e¤ort and hence harvest and enforcement are jointly determined. We compare the countries'enforcement choices with the socially e¢ cient levels of enforcement, given the quotas in force. As an aside, we also consider the potential problem for a social planner of setting optimal quotas, as well as enforcement levels, in order to maximise the total value of the …shery. This raises the interesting question of why quotas are not much lower in 1983 after years of di¢ cult negotiations (see Holden and Garrod 1994) . Since then, the shares have remained more or less constant (according to the so-called principle of "relative stability") as no member state has wanted to reopen the negotiations. A notable exception is the Northeast Atlantic mackerel …shery, which is shared between the EU, Norway and Iceland. In this case, all parties agree on the ICES-recommended TAC, but there is disagreement over quota shares.
than they actually are in practice, since, in the absence of a cost to setting low quotas, with a non-compliant ‡eet the most e¢ cient way of achieving any given level of harvest is to set a very low quota and relax enforcement. We then consider the e¢ cient TAC for the …shery as a whole, given the agreed basis for quota shares and the best-response enforcement and harvest choices of the participating countries'administrations and their …shing ‡eets. Finally, we examine the incentives for countries to seek increases in the TAC during the annual decision-making process in which a recommended TAC must be agreed upon by participant countries.
The paper extends and augments some of the analysis in an earlier paper by Beard and Nøstbakken (2010) , which had as its primary focus a dynamic game in enforcement between the two countries. The present paper models national enforcement choices as competitive (no strategic interaction) and focuses on the problem of TAC setting with …xed quota shares.
The paper is structured as follows. In the section that follows we …rst develop the industry harvest model and then examine the e¢ cient and myopic enforcement choices of the countries, given their TAC shares. In Section 3 we look at the determination of the e¢ cient TAC for a …shery managed by means of national quotas and then consider the incentives for countries to bid up a recommended TAC during annual negotiations. A …nal section concludes.
Model and preliminaries

The industry's harvest response function
We begin by modelling the harvest response (reaction function) of the industry in Country i to the agreed national quota (TAC share) and the national level of enforcement e¤ort.
Here, following Beard and Nøstbakken (2010) , enforcement e¤ort is normalised to the probability that a particular …rm is inspected and …ned for landing over-quota …sh (which implies an underlying linear relationship between enforcement e¤ort and the probability of inspection and sanction). For simplicity, and to abstract from the issue of allocative e¢ ciency at the national level, we represent the industry in each country by a single (price-taking) …rm. The …rm seeks to maximise (expected) per period pro…ts as
where h i is the harvest, p is the (exogenous) market price, c i ( ) are (minimised) harvesting costs, x is the stock size (which the …rm takes as given in the short run), i 2 [0; 1] is enforcement e¤ort (probability of detection), f i is a monetary …ne and q i is the quota. To be speci…c, let
where c i is a harvesting cost parameter and f i is a …ne rate. Note that here the expected penalty for landing over-quota …sh is a linear function of the relative quota violation. This ensures that the …rm's optimal per period harvest is dependent upon the size of the quota q i . Otherwise, the model arguably represents a vessel operating under a management system based upon taxes, rather than quotas. 3 The necessary …rst order condition for an (expected) pro…t-maximising level of harvest is
and we can then …nd the industry's optimal harvest response to the country's choice of i (given a quota q i ) as
Here, we assume that h i > q i and hence i f i =q i > 0, i.e., that the quota is less than the industry's capacity output and that there is non-compliance. Capacity output h i is thus de…ned where i f i =q i = 0 and hence
From (4) we can see that, as would be expected, the industry's optimal harvest response h i ( ) is increasing in the stock size, the market price and the size of the quota and decreasing in harvest costs, enforcement e¤ort and the …ne rate. Note, in particular,
and
We can also see that (7) is decreasing in q i . All else equal, increases in the quota result in increasingly smaller increments in the industry's harvest level as we approach its capacity output h i .
but the functional form used here is less cumbersome. Hatcher (2005 Hatcher ( , 2012 considers the intuition for relative violation arguments in expected penalty functions and examines the implications for modelling quota compliance in natural resource industries.
E¢ cient enforcement
Before proceeding to examine the individual countries'(myopic) enforcement choices, we …rstly consider, as a benchmark, the optimal level of enforcement for each country if a social planner were responsible for the decision, given an agreed annual quota pair q i ; i = 1; 2. We assume that the social planner's objective is to employ enforcement e¤ort in both countries so as to maximise the total discounted ‡ow of industry harvesting pro…ts (including any …nes, since these are simply transfers) less the costs of enforcement, subject to the (known) industry harvest responses and the dynamics of the stock. Omitting time arguments for clarity, the planner's objective functional is
where
is the natural growth function for the stock and r is an appropriate interest rate. Letting
marginal cost of enforcement, the corresponding (current value) Hamiltonian is
where is the Lagrange multiplier on the stock constraint. 4 The necessary conditions for maximising the Hamiltonian with respect to i are
Substituting for h i and h i using (4) and (6), we obtain the e¢ cient level of enforcement e¤ort for Country i as
where a positive level of enforcement implies > ! i c i q i =xf i . Rearranging (10), we can observe that
where ! i =h i = ! i c i q i =xf i . Thus, the e¢ cient level of enforcement results in a shadow price for the stock which is greater than the marginal pro…t from harvesting in Country i. The wedge that is driven between marginal pro…t and the shadow price is due to the (marginal) cost of enforcement, or, more accurately, the marginal reduction in the cost of controlling the harvest through enforcement. This, notice, is increasing in the size of the quota q i . This is because, all else equal, in order to achieve any given harvest level, a larger quota implies a smaller violation which is more costly to attain in terms of enforcement e¤ort.
We can also see from (12) that if the marginal cost of enforcement e¤ort ! i is higher in one country than in the other, then, all else equal, marginal pro…t must be smaller in that country and hence the level of harvest greater. Thus, for a given quota pair, enforcement e¤ort, when allocated optimally, is concentrated in the country where it is least costly to deploy.
For completeness, the corresponding stock condition is
If a steady state exists ( _ x = _ = 0), then given a parameterisation for g (x) we can, in principle, solve for and …nd the optimal stock size x and the optimal enforcement levels i .
E¢ cient enforcement and quota setting
Although we have taken them as given, in principle we should also be able to maximise the value of the …shery with respect to the national quotas q i ; i = 1; 2. If we re-write the Hamiltonian as
where i is some transactional (let us assume, political) cost associated with setting the size of the quota for Country i below some arbitrary level q i , we can …nd the optimal quota conditions
Substituting for h iq using (7), these conditions imply
Comparing (17) with (12), it is apparent that for an e¢ cient solution to exist with respect to both i and q i , we must have
and hence i > 0. For a meaningful solution to (8) which includes quota setting, therefore, it must be costly for a country to reduce its quota (to below some predetermined level).
Otherwise, we can see from looking back at equation (4) that any given level of harvest could always be achieved at least cost by reducing both enforcement e¤ort and the size of the quota. This may appear odd, but is quite rational. Setting a low quota and then relaxing enforcement to allow a relatively large violation is always the least-cost means of achieving a given level of catch, provided it is not costly to reduce the size of the quota. Hence the need for the inclusion of the cost term i [ q i q i ]. Expression (18) then identi…es the optimal ratio between the quota and the level of enforcement for given enforcement costs and the (political) cost of reducing the quota.
Country-speci…c (myopic) enforcement
When each country is unilaterally deciding upon a level of enforcement e¤ort, concern about the long term value of the stock is, we assume, e¤ectively relegated to the international TAC setting process (see Section 3). Once an annual quota pair q i ; i = 1; 2, has been agreed, each country behaves myopically and maximises only current period social bene…ts. Nevertheless, we assume that each country has some concern for adhering to its agreed quota, which we represent by a social cost attached to over-quota harvesting by its ‡eet. Given this, the country's objective function is
where i ( ) is a social damage (or disutility) function for exceeding the quota (measured in monetary units for convenience). In speci…c form, we can write the country's problem as
The …rst order condition for the optimal level of enforcement e¤ort i is then
Substituting for h i and h i using (4) and (6) and rearranging, we obtain
which we can see is exactly analogous to (11). Here, though, since i is a parameter, the interpretation is that a positive level of enforcement e¤ort requires that i > ! i c i q i =xf i = ! i =h i , i.e., the marginal social cost of over-quota landings must exceed the (saving in) enforcement costs of a marginal increase in the over-quota catch. Otherwise, the country will not undertake any costly enforcement. For a given pair of quotas q i , an e¢ cient level of enforcement would, as we might expect, result from i = in each country. If a country cares too little about over-quota catches, the total level of enforcement will be sub-optimal and the total level of harvest will be excessive. On the other hand, we also have the perverse possibility that, if a country cares too much about over-quota landings, it will employ too much costly enforcement e¤ort compared to the e¢ cient level. Clearly, though, what constitutes too much or too little enforcement, relative to the social optimum, depends upon the magnitude of the quotas set. If, for example, the quotas are very low, then the optimal amount of enforcement would be less than if the quotas were set at a higher level. In this case a lower value of i would be appropriate.
On the other hand, for a given value of i , the impact of altering the size of the quota is ambiguous (see below).
We can see from (22) that, all else equal, Country i's choice of enforcement e¤ort i is increasing in its disutility "rate" for over-quota catches i and decreasing in the cost of enforcement ! i . 5 Note that a standard result from enforcement models is that less enforcement e¤ort is required in order to achieve a target level of harvest if the …ne is increased. Here, though, because there are social bene…ts as well as costs to violation, the net impact of altering the …ne rate f i on the optimal level of enforcement is ambiguous.
Increasing the …ne, all else equal, increases the e¤ectiveness of enforcement in reducing (over-quota) harvest, but while this reduces the disutility from over-quota catches, it also reduces industry pro…ts. From
we can see that if i > 2! i c i q i =f i x then increasing the …ne reduces the optimal level of enforcement e¤ort. If increasing the …ne reduces the social costs of harvesting more than the bene…ts, we would expect enforcement e¤ort to be relaxed. Conversely, if increasing the …ne reduces the bene…ts of harvesting more than the social costs, we would expect enforcement to be increased.
The impact of a change in the size of the quota is similarly ambiguous: from
it is apparent that @ i =@q i takes the opposite sign to @ i =@f i . If i is relatively large, re ‡ecting a greater desire by the country to limit over-quota catches, it is more likely that @ i =@q i will be positive, so that an increase in the quota will be matched by an increase in enforcement e¤ort.
Setting the total allowable catch (TAC)
Having established the enforcement e¤ort response of each country to a national quota,
given the harvest response of its …shing industry, we now turn to the problem of setting a TAC when the shares of the TAC used in determining national quotas are …xed. We …rstly examine the determination of the socially optimal TAC, before considering the incentives for countries to bid up a (proposed) TAC during the TAC negotiation process.
Optimal TAC setting with …xed quota shares
To establish the benchmark result, we let an omniscient central planner set an annual TAC Q for the …shery which translates into national quotas q i i Q for the two countries, where 1 + 2 = 1 are the TAC shares that have previously been agreed. Using (22) and (4), we can rewrite the individual countries'enforcement choices as
given their industries'harvest response functions
Substituting (25) into (26) and rearranging, we obtain an expression for industry harvest as a function of Q (given x) as
where, recall, we assume that h i > h i ( ) > i Q. Note that here
Since the country is simultaneously choosing a (privately) optimal level of enforcement e¤ort in response to changes in its quota, industry harvest is now a linear function of the TAC and hence the national quota.
Omitting time arguments as before, the planner's objective functional is
and the corresponding (current value) Hamiltonian is
The …rst order condition for a maximising choice of Q is
Substituting for h i ( ) and @h i ( ) =@Q using (27) and (29), together with
(which, recall, we cannot unambiguously sign) after some rearrangement we obtain
This implies
If the national quotas q i i Q are allocatively e¢ cient, however, it is relatively straight-forward to show that in (34) we will have
We can see from (32) that this is equivalent to
which shows more clearly that, at the optimum, the shadow price of the stock equates with marginal pro…t less the marginal cost of controlling harvest indirectly by means of adjustments in the TAC. While we can rearrange (32) to a¢ rm that here
which recalls (22), note that we cannot unambiguously sign the second term on the RHS of (37).
If the quota shares are such that the TAC is not e¢ ciently allocated (which, in practice, is likely to be the case), equation (34) will hold with
Here, the TAC share to Country i is too small and the share to Country j too large, given the costs of …shing, enforcement costs and the …ne rate pertaining in each country.
If it were politically feasible, of course, we could adjust the shares i and j so that the inequalities disappear and the TAC is e¢ ciently allocated.
The corresponding stock condition in this case is
Again, if a steady state exists, then given the parameters of g (x) we can, in principle, solve for and …nd the optimal stock size x and the optimal TAC Q .
TAC set by political negotiation
Consider a recommended TAC Q, established either as the result of a stock assessment and scienti…c advice or based upon past levels of exploitation. 6 We assume that the incentive for each country to try to negotiate a higher TAC depends upon the (expected) increase in industry pro…ts (net of any …ne payments), less the associated enforcement costs, together with a political cost incurred for increasing the TAC by appearing to be "anti-conservationist". As with i ( ), the subjective cost of exceeding the quota, this could include damage to international reputation, as well as an internal cost. For simplicity, we again assume that this can be represented by a monetary cost, which we will denote i Q; Q . To be speci…c, let i ( ) be a non-linearly increasing function of Q, with
Thus, using (20), we have a marginal (net) social bene…t function for Country i as
6 In the Northeast Atlantic, scienti…c advice on …sheries is provided by ICES (the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea). In the case of EU …sheries, ICES advice is used by the European Commission to propose TACs which must then be agreed by the Fisheries Council, comprising the …sheries ministers of all EU member states. Proposed TACs are either "advisory"-based on stock assessments -or "precautionary"-based only upon historic landings.
After substituting with (27), (29) and (33), this expression can be rearranged to yield
which seems likely, then an agreed TAC is impossible. Either there must be an external arbiter to impose a decision, or, given that the i are assumed …xed, agreement requires countries to change their preferences for sustainability, which implies changing their values of i .
Conclusion
We have modelled the exploitation of a shared …sh stock by two countries with …xed TAC shares. Given the harvest response function of its …shing industry, for a given TAC share each country chooses a level of costly enforcement e¤ort in order to maximise current period economic bene…ts while securing what it regards as an acceptable degree of compliance with the national quota. We compared the countries'myopic enforcement choices with the socially e¢ cient levels of enforcement, given the quotas in force. Optimal enforcement only results if each country perceives a cost to over-quota landings which equates with the shadow price of the stock under optimal management. Otherwise, we have the interesting possibility that a country will expend too much enforcement e¤ort, as well as the possibility of too little.
In passing, we considered the problem for a social planner of setting optimal quotas, as well as enforcement levels, in order to maximise the total value of the …shery given …xed quota shares and industry capacities. This presents a straightforward optimisation problem which, however, can only yield an interior solution if quotas are costly to set at low levels. In the absence of a cost to setting low quotas, with a non-compliant ‡eet the most e¢ cient way of achieving any given level of harvest is always to set a (vanishingly) low quota and relax enforcement to very low levels. This is a rational solution which (perhaps for obvious reasons) is never observed in practice.
Solving the best-response enforcement and harvest choices of the participating countries'
administrations and their …shing ‡eets in order to endogenise enforcement, so that we can express harvest directly as a function of the TAC, we then considered the e¢ cient TAC for the …shery as a whole. We illustrated the signi…cance of the TAC shares in determining the e¢ ciency of the TAC allocation under optimal management. Finally, we developed a model to examine the incentives for countries to seek increases in the TAC above a level recommended during the annual TAC negotiations. In our model, the only brake on seeking a higher TAC is provided by a social cost to the appearance of being "anti-conservationist". Unless we assume that countries with a larger TAC share actively care more about the sustainability of the resource, then these countries will always press for a higher TAC.
